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1 Introduction
Does public capital have e¤ect in income distribution? Many argue
informally that under certain conditions, in particular if it is targeted
at lower income social groups, public capital may reduce inequality.1
On the other hand, it may aggravate it if only the rich few have ac-
cess to it. The question remains: how precisely is public capital linked
to income distribution dynamics, especially, when it is provided on a
non-discriminatory basis? Put di¤erently, how does the income of two
individuals who are heterogenous in terms of their initial wealth but sim-
ilar otherwise, one is rich and the other is poor, be a¤ected di¤erently
from using a public good in their production functions? In this paper,
we propose theoretical answers to these questions.
We begin with the general question of what determines income dis-
tribution dynamics, especially, when both private and public inputs are
involved in production. Income distribution evolves according to rela-
tive private factor income shares. When there are di¤erences in initial
endowment among households who are otherwise similar, the dynamics
of income distribution depends on the degree to which households are
able to exploit their relative initial advantage. The presence of any other
(public good-type) inputs (e.g. infrastructure) in production have no ef-
fect on income distribution dynamics unless it alters the relative private
factor income shares.2
Hicks (1932) argues that elasticity of substitution is the only deter-
minant factor for changes in relative factor shares.3 If the elasticity of
substitution of a factor is greater than unity, then an increase in the
supply of that factor more rapid than that of the others will increase its
relative income share. Of course, if the elasticity of substitution of the
factor is less than unity, then the relative share of the factor decreases.
If it is equal to unity (the case of Cobb-Douglas), changes in supplies of
factors do not have an e¤ect on relative factors shares.
Hickss argument provides useful hints for those seeking (informal)
solutions to the above problems. Whether public capital has an e¤ect
on income distribution dynamics depends on its elasticity of substitution
with regard to private capital. If the elasticity of substitution of public
1See, for instance, The World Bank (1994), Songco (2002) and Brenneman and
Kerf (2002).
2For a detailed discussion, refer Getachew (2008). See also the example below.
3In the beginning of 1930s, Sir John Hicks (1932) marked an important advance
on identifying the determinant of the distribution of income. In his book, "On The
Theory of Wages," Hicks dedicated a chapter, (with an appendix), on analyzing
the resultant conguration of relative factor share. He developed a very important
concept, which is useful till this time, what he called it "elasticity of substitutions."
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capital to private capital, in a production function, is greater than unity,
an investment in public capital increases its relative income share, and
decreases the private capital income share. Consequently, public capital
would have a positive impact on income distribution dynamics. However,
if its elasticity of substitution is less than unity, then public capital in-
creases the private capital income share, and hence, public capital would
aggravate income inequality. Of course, if the elasticity of substitution is
unity, infrastructure investment is neutral to the distribution of income.
We formalize these ideas using a variable elasticity of substitution
(VES) production function, which is analytically tractable, and, at the
same time, allows some exibility in the parameters. Note that for a
change in factor supply in a production function to change the structure
of income distribution, rst of all, the elasticity of substitution must be
di¤erent from unity. However, the standard Cobb-Douglas (CD) produc-
tion function has no such property. In the CD function, the elasticity
of substitution is equal to unity and hence the factor shares are xed.
The analytical tractability of this popular production function comes
with the cost of stringent restrictions on factor shares, which makes the
production function unsuited for income distribution analysis.4
Analysed within the framework of a CD production function, income
distribution dynamics are wholly independent of the level or change of
the infrastructure inputs used in the production function.5 For exam-
ple, suppose that the individual production function is the standard
CD function yt = A (kt)
 (Xt)
 where kt is private capital and Xt is
public capital. Assume further that private capital, which initially dif-
fers among individuals, is distributed lognormally, i.e., ln kt~N(t, 
2
t ).
Then, an individuals saving at t+1 is kt+1 = syt = sA (kt)
 (Xt)
, where
s is an exogenous saving rate. Income distribution at t + 1 is given by,
a long story cut short, var(ln kt+1) = 2t+1 = 
22t .
6 Therefore, in this
economy, what matters for income distribution dynamics is neither Xt
nor its output elasticity  but the predetermined private capital income
share .
Therefore, the production function that is used for the study is the
4Although Solow (1957; 1960 ) argue a Cobb-Douglas production function may
do fairly well in tracking observed changes in production, he states in a condition,
"as long as no deep distributive meaning is read into the results."
5An exception to this case is presented in Getachew (2008). Getachew (2008)
models public capital, in a CD function, as rival congestible input where its im-
portance varies among households. In that case, in the absence of a perfect credit
market, public capital could relax resource constraints of the poor, and brings a
disproportional positive impact on the income of the poor, which in turn goes to
reducing income inequality.
6See Appendix A for the aggregation.
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less common generalized Cobb-Douglas production function, which is
developed by Newman and Read (1961). The Newman-Read produc-
tion function is a VES production function, but for a certain value of its
parameter it contains the standard CD function. As is discussed above,
the standard CD production function yt = A (ht)
 (Gt)
 imposes strict
restrictions on the factor shares and on the elasticity of substitution.
Particularly, the relative factor shares, denoted by  and , are xed
and the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity. On the other hand,
the constant elasticity of substitutions (CES) production function, which
is the other standard production function, has a relatively less stringent
restrictions on the parameters but may not provide an analytical solu-
tion for the problems we pose due to di¢ culties that may arise during
aggregation.
The Newman-Read generalized CD function is both exible in the
values of the parameters and analytically tractable in regard to income
distribution studies. Moreover, the production function reduces to the
standard CD function for a certain value of its parameter. Newman and
Read (1961) developed the generalized CD production function speci-
cally to address the need for less stringent restrictions on factor income
shares. They consider a case where the income share of a factor re-
mains invariant to changes in that input itself, with the other factor
held constant, but varies with changes of the other factor. In this case,
the production function becomes a VES production function where the
factor shares vary alongside changes in factors supply.
In the next sections, we present a model of a two-sector economy
where one of the sectors uses the Newman and Read (1961) produc-
tion function. In the model, we suppose an economy, populated by
heterogenous agents, consists of two production sectors: human capital
accumulation and goods production sector. In the former, human cap-
ital is generated using inputs from public and private resources while
production technology is characterized by the standard CD function.
Moreover, production in the goods sector takes place using both private
and public resources, but the production function that is used this time
is the generalized CD function of Newman and Read (1961).
Within this setting, we show that a change in the supply of public
capital in the goods production sector could a¤ect income distribution
dynamics, at least in the short run, although no additional specication
are imposed to vary the benets that accrue from using public capital
among di¤erent households. As mentioned earlier, the e¤ect of public
capital on income distribution dynamics could be negative or positive
depending on the elasticity of substitution of public capital to private
capital. If the elasticity of substitutions is greater (lesser) than unity,
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then public capital decreases (increases) income inequality. In the long
run, in the context of a growing economy, the elasticity of substitution is
assumed to tend toward unity and, hence, the generalized CD function
reduces to the standard CD function.7 The model thus turns into a
standard AK type endogenous growth model in the long term.
Some functions of public capital may also be worth mentioning. In
growth literature public capital is usually treated as a factor that en-
hances productivity and complements the accumulation of private in-
puts. However, there is no doubt that public capital could also func-
tion as a substitutable factor that could relax householdsresource con-
straintsparticularly for poor households, in the context of imperfect
credit markets.8 Of course, whether the elasticity of substitution be-
tween public and private capital is greater or lesser than one depends
on the type of public capital made available.9 But, in general, one of
the functions of public capital is to provide opportunities and resources
to individuals that they could not otherwise a¤ord. This role of public
capital may suggest that it could have a higher elasticity of substitu-
tion than private capital as a general proposition. As Hicks noted one
of the things upon which elasticity of substitution of factors depends is
"...the mere extension of the use of instruments and methods of pro-
duction from rms where they were previously employed to rms which
could not previously a¤ord them" (Hicks 1932, p.120). Moreover, it
is possible to mention some instances where public capital has clearly
a large elasticity of substitutions, particularly in developing countries.
Public education and public health infrastructure, for instance, may be
considered good substitutions of private education and private health
infrastructure.
The strand of literature related to the present study deals with the
relationship between income inequality and public capital. Recently,
a growing number of empirical studies try to assess the impact of in-
frastructure on income inequality. For instance, Calderón and Serven
(2004), Calderón and Chong (2004) and Lopez (2004) nd that in-
frastructure (water, sanitary, electricity, etc.) reduce income inequality
and enhance economic growth at the same time. World Bank (2003)
and Estache (2003) argue infrastructure has a positive and dispropor-
tionate impact on growth. OECD (2006) reports that "infrastructure
is important for pro-poor growth". Whereas, Ferreira (1995) argues
7Empirical studies show factor shares, particularly that of private inputs (such as
labor), show a large movement in the short run whereas they become stable in the
long run (e.g. Acemoglu 2003; Revankar 1971).
8See, for instance, World Bank (1994) and Romp and de haan (2005; 2007).
9And, this is a question which is more of an empirical.
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theoretically, in a model with quite a complex setup, public capital is
important for income distribution dynamics. Getachew (2008) attempts
to analytically capture their relationship using the popular standard CD
function (refer footnote 4).
Another strand of literature related to the present study deals with
the dynamics of income inequality and growth within an imperfect credit
markets (e.g. Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and New-
man (1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Aghion and
Howit (1998), Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999), and Ben-
abou (1996; 2000; 2002)). These literatures in general show that in
the face of capital market imperfection, income inequality has a denite
negative e¤ect on growth. This is because when the credit markets are
imperfect, relatively more high-return investment opportunities would
be forgone by resource poor households in inegalitarian society than
egalitarian ones.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model,
with a brief discussion on the property of the Newman-Read production
function. Section 3 is all about the evolution of income distribution and
public capital. Section 4 discusses the long run (equilibrium) properties
of the model, and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Assume a continuum of heterogenous households, in overlapping genera-
tions, i 2 [0; 1]. Each household i consists of an adult of generation t and
a child of generation t+1. Population size is thus constant and normal-
ized to be one. Let, at the beginning initial period, each household i of
the initial generation be endowed with an initial human capital h0 and
a public infrastructure G0 which is shared with others. Assume further
that the distribution of initial human capital  (h0) takes a lognormal
form, lnh0~N(0; 
2
0).
Agents care about their consumption level and the human capital
stock of their children. When young, they accumulate human capital
using both private and public resources. Once they become adults, they
use their human capital for nal goods production. Government taxes
income with two xed at rate taxes,  and  , in order to nance public
capital, denoted by Gt and Mt, in the goods production and human
capital accumulation sectors, respectively.10 During their active periods,
individuals allocate after tax income between current consumption ct
10Note that in the paper, small and capital letters are used to denote individual
and aggregate (average) variables, respectively.
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and saving et that will be used to educate their children. The latter is
incorporated in individualsutility functions as the "joy of giving".
In a logarithmic preference, the utility of an individual is dened as
ln ct +  lnht+1 (1)
subject to
ct + et = (1      )yt (2)
where yt is income of an individual at time t.
The human capital accumulation function of the o¤spring ht+1 is a
function of public Mt and parental investment et. The accumulation
function takes the standard CD form, in this sector, with constant re-
turns to scale in factors. Thus, for an individual who is born at time t,
the human capital at t+ 1 is given by
ht+1 = B (Mt)
1  (et)
 (3)
2.2 The Firm
There is an innite number of competitive small rms. Households own
the rms.11 Production at the rm level occurs using both private and
public capital, in a Newman-Read production function setting. Thus,
the income of an agent of generation t, in the Newman-Read production
function, is dened as
yt = A (ht)
 (Gt)
1  exp (t lnht lnGt) (4)
where yt and Gt represent output, and public capital, respectively. t is
a parameter, whose sign is found to be an important determinant of the
behavior of the elasticity of substitution. We will discus its property in
detail later on.12
The aggregate production function Yt is computed, simply, by aggre-
gating (4), Yt 
R 1
0
yt (ht),
Yt = A (Gt)
1  (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
2t
2
(+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1)
(5)
11This shuts o¤ the input and the credit markets.
12Note that the production function, in (4), reduces to the standard CD function
if t equal to zero, t = 0.
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where Ht is the aggregate (average) human capital, which is dened,
Ht 
R 1
0
ht (ht).  (ht) is the distribution of wealth at time t, which is
assumed to take a lognormal distribution, i.e., lnht~N(t; 
2
t ).
13
2.2.1 Properties of the Newman-Read Production Function
Although its use is relatively rare in the literature of economic growth,
the Newman-Read production function o¤ers a exible analytical frame-
work for income distribution studies. Empirical studies reveal factor
shares show large uctuations in the short run whereas they show no
trend in the long run (e.g. Acemoglu 2003).14 The Newman-Read gen-
eralized CD production function contains a framework that provides a
satisfactory approximation to this reality, in particular contrast to the
popular CD function. The less popular production function provides
a framework for analyzing the short run uctuations in factor income
shares whereas the standard CD function does not.15 The latter is more
appropriate for analyzing long run trends. Whereas, the Newman-Read
production function is a general form of the standard CD function that
could reduce to it when necessary(e.g., when analyzing long run trends).
According to Solow (1957), a particular functional form adopted for
a production function is a matter of no great consequence as far as it
posses a positive partial derivative and the right curvature. For certain
values of its parameters, the Newman-Read production function, in (4),
satises important properties of the neoclassical production function,
i.e., it has a positive marginal productivity and a concave curvature:
The rst and the second derivative of the production function in (4)
are given by
@yt
@ht
=
yt
ht
(+ t lnGt)
@y
@Gt
=
y
Gt
(1  + t lnht)
and
13While aggregating (4), we use the fact thatZ 1
0
((ht)

exp (t lnht lnGt))  (ht) = (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
2t
2
(+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1)
(See Appendix A).
14Acemoglu states factor shares of labor show a large movement in the short run
whereas they remain stable in the long run. See Figure 1 and 2, which he plots for
United State and France, respectively.
15Recall that elasticity of substitution equals to unity and hence factor shares are
xed in the popular CD function.
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@yt
@ht@ht
=
yt
(ht)
2 (+ t lnGt) ((+ t lnGt)  1)
@yt
@Gt@Gt
=
yt
(Gt)
2 (t lnht   ) ((t lnht   )  1)
Assumptions 2.2
1. 0 < ,  < 1; A, Gt,ht > 1
2. (lnGt)
 1 >  t () 1; (lnht) 1 > t () 1 and (lnht) 1 >  t (1  ) 1
3. lim
t!1
t = 0, jtj < 1 otherwise; where t is su¢ ciently large.
Under Assumptions 2.2, the Newman-Read production function in
(4) obeys the neoclassical rule in that it has positive marginal produc-
tivity and concave curvatures with respect to both private and public
capital. Formally,
yt > 0;
@yt
@ht
> 0;
@y
@Gt
> 0;
@yt
@ht@ht
< 0 and
@yt
@Gt@Gt
< 0
Moreover, under the above assumptions,
@yt
@ht@Gt
=
@yt
@Gt@ht
=
yt
Gtht
((1  + t lnht)(+ t lnGt) + t) > 0
which implies that public capital enhances the marginal productivity of
private capital, and vice versa.
The elasticity of substitutions, of the production function, implied by
(4), denoted by hG and Gh, for public and private capital, respectively,
are16
t= hG = Gh 
@yt
@ht
@yt
@Gt
yt
@yt
@Gt@ht
=
(+ t lnGt)(1  + t lnht)
(+ t lnGt)(1  + t lnht) + t > 0 (6)
Equation (6) implies that the sign of t determines whether the elas-
ticity of substitution between private and public capital is greater or
lesser than, or, equal to unity. That is,
If t S 0, then t T 1 (7)
16The original formula was presented by Hicks (1932), Appendix (iii).
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2.3 Government
We assume government budget is balanced at all times:
Igt =
Z 1
0
yt  (ht) = Yt (8)
Mt=
Z 1
0
yt (ht) = Yt (9)
Thus, the government collects xed proportional taxes  and  on output
Yt to nance public investment, while the accumulation of public capital
in the goods production sector follows the rule,
Gt+1 = I
g
t +Gt(1  {g) (10)
where Gt, I
g
t and {g are the public capital stock, public investment and
depreciation, respectively.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
According to the above description, an individual at period t solves the
following problem, which is derived by substituting (2) and (3) into (1),
Max
et
ln(1   )yt   et) +  lnB (Mt)1  (et) (11)
taking as given,  ,  , Igt Mt and Gt.
The rst order condition gives
et = a(1      )yt (12)
where a = 
1+
; (12) shows the agents optimal saving as the function
of his income.
To derive individualshuman capital accumulation equation, which
is associated to their optimal behavior, substitute (9) and (12) into (3),
and using (4) and (5), to get,17
ht+1 = B (Gt)
(1 )

A (Ht)
(+t lnGt)
1 
(ht)
 (a(1      )A) exp (t)
(13)
where
t  
2
t
2
((+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1) (1  )) + (t lnht lnGt)
17See Appendix B for the details of the derivation of (13).
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According to (13), an individuals human capital accumulation is
determined by the human capital of his parent ht, and aggregate private
and public capital stock and initial income distribution, Ht, Gt, and
2t , respectively. Income inequality apparently has a negative impact on
individualscapital accumulation.
3 Public Capital and Income Distribution Dynam-
ics
The following two di¤erence equations that are derived from (13) char-
acterize the evolution of capital accumulation and income distribution
in the economy
t+1=E [lnht+1] = t + lnBA+ ln ()
1  (a(1      ))
+(1  ) lnGt + ((+ t lnGt) (1  )) lnHt + t (14)
2t+1  V ar [lnht+1] = 2 (+ t lnGt)2 2t (15)
Under assumptions 2.2, which implies 0 <  (+ t lnGt) < 1, in-
come inequality will decline through time and ultimately disappear:
lim
t!1
2 = 0
where 2 is equilibrium income distribution. However, the disappear-
ance of income inequality in the steady state should not be confused
with a stylized fact. The reason that income inequality disappears in
the long run is that, in the model, initial wealth is the only source of
heterogeneity between individuals; but agents are otherwise similar (in
terms of ability, technology, etc.) Therefore, a diminishing return on
net private accumulative factors,  (+ t lnGt) < 1, implies resource
poor households are more productive than rich ones; consequently, it is
inevitable that the poor will catch up with the rich in the long run.
The model thus captures only the short run e¤ect of public capital.
The role of public capital in this model inuences the speed of conver-
gence of income distribution. Depending on the sign of t (and hence
the size of t), the public good Gt, in the nal goods production sector,
a¤ects income distribution dynamics negatively or positively during the
economys transition to its long run equilibrium. Recall from equation
(7) that the sign of t determines the value of elasticity of substitution
t whether it is greater, less than, or equal to unity, which in turn deter-
mines what e¤ect the public capitalGt could have on income distribution
dynamics.
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If t = 0, then t = 1,the Cobb-Douglas case, there is no relation-
ship between public capital and income distribution. But, if t > 0, then
t < 1, investment in public capital Gt aggravates income disparities, at
least in the short run. The reason is, if t < 1, then, an increase in
the public capital increases the relative income share of private capital,
which ultimately disproportionally benets the rich who hold much of
the production resources. On the other hand, if t < 0, then t > 1,
an increase in the public good Gt decreases the relative income share
of private capital. Consequently, income inequality decreases as poor
household are able to relax some of their resource constraints through
factor substitution.
4 Dynamics of Other Macroeconomic Variables
To determine the dynamics of other macro variables, rst aggregate (13)
to obtain the equation that characterizes the evolution of aggregate hu-
man capital,
Ht+1=BA (Gt)
(1 ) a(1      ) ()1  (Ht)(+t lnGt)
exp
 
t
 
2    + 1 (16)
where18
t =
2t
2
((+  lnGt) (+  lnGt   1))
Then, derive the dynamic equation for the public capital in the goods
production sector by substituting (8) into (10), using (5), and assuming
a complete depreciation ( {g = 1)
Gt+1 =  A (Gt)
1  (Ht)
(+ lnGt) exp (t) (17)
At equilibrium lim
t!1
2 = 0, aggregate capital ratio converges to a
constant value, using (16) and (17),
H
G
=
Ba(1      ) ()(1 )
 
(18)
18While aggregating (13), we use the fact thatZ 1
0
((ht)

exp (t lnht lnGt))  (ht) = (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
 
2t

(see appendix A).
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From, equation (18), it is apparent that in the long run, the economy
behaves as a standard AKt model. Aggregate variables will be in a
balanced growth path, where H, G and Y grow at the same rate.19
The long run growth rate  of the economy can easily be computed
from the equilibrium value of (16),
= lnHt+1   lnHt
= lnB + lnA+  ln a+  ln(1      ) + (1  ) ln  + (  1) ln Ht
Gt
and then substituting (18) into the above equation,
 = lnA+ lnB+ ln a+ ln(1   )+ (1  ) ln +(1 ) ln 
(19)
As of the literatures in public capital and economic growth, both taxes
relate positively but non-linearly to long term growth (e.g., Barro 1990).
The growth maximizing taxes,   and   are given by
 =(1  ) (20)
 =(1  ) (21)
The growth maximizing tax for public capital in the goods production
sector   is equal to the share of public capital in the sector (similar
to Barros (1990) nding) while the growth maximizing tax for public
capital in human capital accumulation sector   is equal to the share of
the public capital in that sector times the long run output elasticity of
human capital.
5 Conclusion
It is well understood that public capital is important for economic growth.
But, is public capital important for income inequality? It is intuitive
that public capital may reduce inequality, particularly if it is targeted at
lower income groups. Nonetheless, public capital may aggravate income
inequality if only the rich few have access to it. But, as we have shown
here, even if it is provided in a non-discriminatory basis, public capital
remains important for income distribution dynamics.
The e¤ect of public capital on income distribution is strongly linked
to its elasticity of substitution to private capital. If the elasticity of
19Let the variables without time subscript (H, G, Y and 2) denote steady state
values.
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substitution of a given type of public input is greater than unity, then
it might have a positive and disproportionate impact on the income of
the poor. Particularly, if the credit market is imperfect, the provision
of public capital enjoying high elasticity of substitution to private cap-
ital, even on a non-discriminatory basis, might help the poor more by
relaxing some of their resource constraints. This, in turn, results in an
improvement in the distribution of income of the economy.
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A Aggregation
With the assumption of a lognormal distribution for individuals human
capital, lnht~N(t; 
2
t ), we have the following relation
lnE[ht] = E[lnht] +
2t
2
()E[lnht] = E[lnht]  
2
t
2
 lnHt   
2
t
2
(A1)
since E [ht] =
R 1
0
ht (ht)  Ht
The fact that
R 1
0
ln yt (ht)  (ht) = E(ln yt), where  (ht) is the distri-
bution function of (the random variable) ht. Then,
YtE [yt] = E

A (ht)
 (Gt)
1  exp (t lnht lnGt)

=A (Gt)
1 E [(ht)
 exp (t lnht lnGt)]
We derive, in equation (5),
Yt = A (Gt)
1  (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
2t
2
(+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1)
(5)
by using the above facts.
That is, if ht is a lognormal distribution then (ht)
 exp (t lnht lnGt)
is also a lognormal distribution since ln (ht exp (t) lnht lnGt)) = (+ t lnGt) lnht
is normal. Then, according to (A1),
lnE [(ht)
 exp (t lnht lnGt)]
=E[ln (ht)
 + (t lnht lnGt)] +
1
2
var[ln (ht)
 + (t lnht lnGt)]
=E[(+ t lnGt) lnht] +
1
2
var[(+ t lnGt) lnht]
= (+ t lnGt)

lnHt   
2
t
2

+ (+ t lnGt)
2
2
t
2
= (+ t lnGt) lnHt + (+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1) 
2
t
2
Then,
E [(ht)
 exp (t lnht lnGt)]
= (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
2t
2
(+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1) (A2)
14
To derive
E [(ht)
 exp (t lnht lnGt)]
= (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp

2t
2
2 (+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1)

in (16), follow similar steps as above.
B Dynamics of Individual Human Capital
To derive the individuals human capital accumulation equation, substi-
tute (9) and (12), into (3), to get
ht+1 = B (Yt)
1  (a(1      )yt)
Then, substitute (4) and (5) into the above equation
ht+1=B

A (Gt)
1  (Ht)
(+t lnGt) exp
2t
2
(+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1)
1 
(ht)
  a(1      )A (Gt)1  exp (t lnht lnGt)
=B (Gt)
(1 )(1 )+(1 )

A (Ht)
(+t lnGt)
1 
(ht)
 (a(1      )A)
exp

2t
2
((+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1) (1  )) + (t lnht lnGt)

After rearranging, we get equation (13) of Section 2.4,
ht+1 = B (Gt)
(1 )

A (Ht)
(+t lnGt)
1 
(ht)
 (a(1      )A) exp(t)
(13)
where
t  
2
t
2
((+ t lnGt) (+ t lnGt   1) (1  )) + (t lnht lnGt)
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